Introduction
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, developments in aircraft and engine design made it a military necessity to tackle the aerodynamic problems of the so-called 'transonic regime' -that is, the flow of air over aircraft at flight speeds closely above or below Mach 1, the ratio of the speed of flight to the speed of sound.
1 As at lower speeds, the overall effort included fundamental theoretical work involving a number of different persons and groups, embracing aeronautical engineers, applied mathematicians and in the transonic case (and at first unintentionally) at least one pure mathematician.
2 They often, though not always, shared the same general goals but naturally brought to the task somewhat different orientations. This division of labor raises a number of questions. For example, how, in attacking these theoretical problems, was the mathematical knowledge of the aeronautical engineer and applied mathematician related to that of the pure mathematician? That there were differences, even when they addressed and manipulated 'the same equation' is evident. The problem we shall address is how best to characterize these differences and trace their implications for a broader analysis of mathematical knowledge. We shall do this, in part, on the basis of a case study of research on a transonic problem. In order to put the case study in context, and to highlight the mathematical dimension of it that is of most interest to us here, we need to explain that, in the United States in the years surrounding World War II, 'applied mathematics turned into a subject of national debate' (Greenberg & Goodstein, 1983 : 1303 . This debate, as another historian put it, 'split the nation's mathematicians into angry factions' (Owens, 1989: 298) . It arose because the demands of the war led to a marked rise in the status and importance of applied mathematics relative to pure mathematics. This countered the routinely accepted dominance of the more abstract styles of work. The pure mathematicians meanwhile had become aware of the danger that their skills would be under-utilized and their contributions under-appreciated. The situation was exacerbated by the arrival in the US of refugee mathematicians who were often strong representatives of the more concrete and applied fields. 3 We shall draw from some of the polemics of the time to furnish us with two, powerful and widely recognized stereotypes of pure and applied mathematics and their proper relationship to one another. These stereotypes will provide a baseline against which to respond to the case study and will serve to highlight some general problems about the nature and relation of different aspects of mathematical activity. They will also allow us to move from the case study to more general questions about disciplinary boundaries and, ultimately, to issues concerning the nature of mathematical rigor itself. Rigor bears a deep, but far from obvious, connection to our sense of the purity or applicability of mathematics and the real or imagined division of labor suggested by these ideas. One of our stereotypes is taken from the writing of the engineering aerodynamicist Theodore von Kármán; the other from the Harvard pure mathematician Garrett Birkhoff.
Kármán Speaks for Engineers
Theodore von Kármán (1881 Kármán ( -1963 was born in Hungary. Before World War I he made his reputation working in fluid dynamics and aerodynamics at Göttingen under Ludwig Prandtl and then, as director of his own institute, at Aachen. He came to the California Institute of Technology in 1930 and played a major role in making it one of the world's leading centers in aeronautical research. 4 In a lecture to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers on 8 February 1940, Kármán offered 'Some Remarks on Mathematics from an Engineer's Viewpoint' (Kármán, 1940) . 5 Mathematics, he said, has been called the handmaiden of science. Engineers, however, tend not to see it in such an amiable light. On the contrary, they feel rather like the sorcerer's apprentice, who has set some obscure, magical process in train and then found that it runs out of control. Kármán looked back wistfully to the age of Newton, Bernoulli, and Euler when the relation between mathematicians and engineers was both closer and more balanced. In those days, said Kármán, there was no real boundary between their work. Mathematical symbols had intuitive and physical significance, and the driving force behind mathematical investigations was the desire to describe the physical world. This state of affairs Kármán called the 'constructive' or 'heroic' age. Alas, it was followed by an age of 'codification' that arose in the 19th century and still retains its baleful influence. Mathematicians came to focus their attention on questions of logical rigor, consistency and completeness. They turned away from reality towards the foundations of their discipline and paid correspondingly less attention to the well-behaved mathematical functions of use to the engineer. The engineer needs functions that can be differentiated and integrated and has little interest in those with, say, infinite numbers of discontinuities. Mathematicians became, and remain, like doctors who have become so fascinated with disease and pathology that they have lost interest in everyday health.
The harmony of the heroic period thus gave way to something that occasionally approached hostility. Obviously the pure mathematician cannot be tied down by practical considerations of immediate usefulness. 'However, one can easily understand that the mentalities of the mathematician and the engineer necessarily diverged in the period of criticism and codification ' (p. 3) . The result of the divergence was that engineers lost their sense of a secure grip on mathematics, while the mathematicians began to look down on engineers as second-class citizens. Kármán admits that engineers are somewhat intimidated by mathematicians and do not feel confident enough to rebel openly. Their resentment expresses itself in other ways -a certain Schadenfreude, perhaps, when Gödel's theorem appeared and suggested that the logical foundations of mathematics are not all that they seemed; or a tendency to follow the example of Oliver Heaviside and make jokes about serious mathematical matters like convergence conditions. 6 Kármán warned his listeners against what he called the 'formalistic' tendencies of mathematicians. 'Many engineers', he said, 'were handicapped in their use of mathematics by the formalistic development of some branches of analysis ' (p. 3) . For example, engineers are at home with the circular functions, sine and cosine, and the second-order differential equations that define the class of circular functions. Other, more complicated, differential equations define a great variety of further functions, 'such as Bessel, Legendre, Hermite, Mathieu, hypergeometric, gamma, theta, zeta functions, and the like ' (p. 4) . Some of these, on occasion, are 'even quite useful' for the engineer, but the general tendency to focus upon and explore the subject of the special functions is misguided from the point of view of engineering. Despite this, it fills great portions of the textbooks and curricula. Hapless engineers think they have to learn about them, but in reality this is about as useful as memorizing Webster's dictionary. Perhaps the greatest merit of the special functions, said Kármán slightingly, is that they have been nicely tabulated, but even so, algebraic or trigonometric approximations will often be more practical.
There will, concluded Kármán, 'always be a difference in the viewpoint of the abstract scientist and the practical engineer' (p. 5). The practical engineer uses 'mechanical feeling and intuition' (p. 5), the mathematician is concerned with more abstract questions such as 'the proof of the existence and uniqueness of solutions' (p. 5). Nevertheless, some of the great names of the recent past, such as Lord Rayleigh in Cambridge and Felix Klein in Göttingen, have set the right example. On these grounds Kármán professed to see signs of improvement in the relationship between mathematicians and engineers and, perhaps, even a 'renewal of the spirit of the heroic age' (p. 5).
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Birkhoff Speaks for Mathematicians
To provide a contrast to Kármán, who spoke for 'we engineers', we shall now look at a spokesman for 'the mathematician'. Garrett Birkhoff (1911-96) was a pure mathematician known to generations of mathematics students through his textbook A Survey of Modern Algebra (Birkhoff & Mac Lane, 1941) . Although primarily a specialist in lattice theory, Birkhoff nevertheless ventured into applied mathematics in a series of lectures in the late 1940s on the foundations of hydrodynamics. The result was Hydrodynamics. A Study in Logic, Fact, and Similitude (Birkhoff, 1950) , a book dealing with the numerous 'paradoxes' involving mathematical argument and physical observation that abound in the field. The most famous of these is 'd'Alembert's paradox', demonstrating that a body immersed in a uniformly flowing, non-viscous fluid (or, at least, in an idealized fluid of a mathematically tractable kind with no discontinuities in the flow) will, contrary to common observation, experience zero lift and zero drag. The label 'hydrodynamics' was used inclusively, and Birkhoff's examples included puzzling cases drawn from aerodynamics and ballistics (fields to which he had been exposed during the war). While Kármán, as we have seen, was prepared to champion the feeling and intuition that enters into the work of the engineer and applied mathematician, Birkhoff portrayed it as a frequent source of error. Hydrodynamics and aerodynamics, he argued, are a subtle blend of induction and deduction, of intuition and logic. What was needed, however, was not the ever more artful exercise of intuition but more careful and rigorous reasoning. A greater use of powerful mathematical techniques was needed to discipline our unreliable, qualitative intuitions. Birkhoff was no friend of mathematical logic, which he judged to be too preoccupied with the foundations of set theory (p. 5) and, while he recognized that knowing when a hydrodynamic theory was 'applicable' was an important 'art' (p. 3), he had no time for the assumption upon which the practice of the art was based.
According to Birkhoff, this assumption, which was widely held, was that the gap between theory and experiment all comes down to one thing, namely, that the fluid of mathematical theory has zero viscosity, in contrast to the viscosity of real fluids which, even when small, must always be finite. The books that take this line, said Birkhoff, 'tend to minimize the importance of logical and mathematical rigor, and to trace all discrepancies between 'theory' and 'experiment' to the single 'unjustified' approximation of zero viscosity' (p. 3). The real root of the trouble, he said, 'lies deeper, in lack of precisely that deductive rigor whose importance is so commonly minimized by physicists and engineers' (p. 4). It lies not in a single act of mathematical simplification but in a variety of plausible, but in fact invalid, physical assumptions, such as that small causes always have small effects or that symmetric causes always produce symmetric effects. Examined carefully, the false or 'paradoxical' conclusions that follow from the assumption about small causes 'should interest the pure mathematician by providing suggestive evidence regarding the facts about partial differential equations -a complex subject concerning which our knowledge is still very rudimentary' (p. 5). In general, the various paradoxes 'show the necessity of comparing theory with experiment' and 'demonstrate the need which the theory of partial differential equations has for fresh physical inspiration' (pp. 36-7). On the other hand, it is undeniable that physical 'oversimplifications' do expedite the use of theory, and 'mathematicians can perform a useful service if they will analyze critically these oversimplifications, by the deductive method, and so establish their limitations more clearly' (p. 37). Birkhoff apparently saw pure and applied mathematics as disciplines that can interact advantageously but are still distinguishable.
While Kármán sought to bolster the confidence of engineers in their dealings with mathematicians, so Birkhoff addressed the corresponding problem as it is experienced by the mathematicians. Sometimes their mathematical deductions seem to fly in the face of so-called 'common sense'. This can place mathematicians at a disadvantage and expose them to the charge that they inhabit a world of useless abstractions. Birkhoff told his fellow mathematicians to keep their nerve. They should hold examples of the following kind before their minds: A classic solution for axial nonviscous supersonic flow over a cone shows a constant pressure on the conical surface. It is also well-known that the mathematical theory of nonviscous fluids permits a region bounded by a streamline or surface at constant pressure to be replaced, in principle, by motionless fluid. 'Hence, mathematically, supersonic flow past a flat disc is possible, in which an invisible conical air barrier separates the onrushing air from the disc' (p. 39). Intuition and common sense would reject this, however, as 'absurdly unstable' (p. 39). Birkhoff likened this to the similar rejection, in the case of a discontinuous subsonic flow, of a '(mathematically possible) upstream wake ' (p. 39) . Surely, says our common sense, the effects of an obstacle should lie downstream of the cause -an 'upstream wake' sounds like a contradiction in terms. Yet, insisted Birkhoff, it is common sense that is fallible here and mathematical deduction that triumphs. To drive the point home he reproduced a photograph, taken in a ballistics research laboratory, that shows the 'absurd' supersonic flow in front of the disc. Indeed the photograph, captioned 'Common sense contradicted', is the proud frontispiece of the book. Provided the mathematician has a clear understanding of the hydrodynamic paradoxes, and that means a logically rigorous understanding, Birkhoff argued that 'the mathematician need have no inferiority complex about the soundness of purely deductive reasoning (as contrasted with 'physical reasoning') in fluid mechanics' (p. 39).
We shall return later to a comparison of Kármán's and Birkhoff's stereotypes with each other and with the following case study drawn from the theoretical aerodynamics of the time.
Transonic Aerodynamic Theory
First Steps -During World War II, as the speed of aircraft approached the speed of sound pilots encountered strange buffeting effects and difficulties in handling the controls. There was talk of a 'sound barrier'. It appeared that regions of locally supersonic flow, followed by shock waves (akin to detonation waves), were building up around the wings, and the phenomenon of 'shock stall' (sudden loss of lift) began to appear. Theoretically, this meant that the compressibility of the air needed to be taken into account when trying to understand and predict aerodynamic properties such as lift and drag. But transonic flow, in which the local velocities in the flow field are subsonic in some regions and supersonic in others, generates some peculiar analytical difficulties, more so than either wholly subsonic or wholly supersonic flow fields.
8 Experts did not view this 'sound barrier' with the awe that it seemed to command in the popular imagination; nevertheless, it posed serious practical as well as theoretical problems. Did the transition from wholly subsonic to wholly supersonic flow perhaps require passage through a transonic phase where the flow was inherently unstable? Perhaps a smooth transition would never be possible, with all the problems that would imply for the design of safe high-speed aircraft.
Where compressibility can be ignored, the governing equations of nonviscous fluid mechanics are linear (that is, additive or 'superposable'). When it has to be taken into account, they become basically nonlinear, and this fact generates considerable mathematical difficulties. In particular, solutions to the differential equations of flow are now no longer additive, that is, one cannot superpose two relatively simple known solutions to produce a more complicated unknown one, as is commonly done with linear theory. For some compressible-flow problems, the existing body of aerodynamic theory had been able to circumvent this difficulty by exploiting certain simplifications, such as the assumption that aerofoils are thin and bodies are slender so that the disturbances they create are correspondingly small. So long as the flow is wholly subsonic or supersonic, this approximation recovers a linear differential equation that is susceptible of solution. These linear equations of small-disturbance compressibility theory turned out to be the point of departure for the next move. That move, as it suggested itself to several independent workers in the field, was to make the least possible concession to the nonlinear transonic situation by, in effect, adding just one of the numerous nonlinear terms from the full compressible-flow equation.
Another expedient that suggested itself -this one purely mathematical and only applicable in two-dimensional flow (i.e. as in a flat plane like, say, a sheet of paper) -was the so-called hodograph transformation. Ordinarily, in thinking about a flow and setting up the governing differential equations, the simplest and most obvious way to proceed is in terms of the velocity as a function of position. One asks, in effect, what components u,v of velocity will be found at a given point x,y of the flow field ( Figure 1a) . Solution of the resulting equations provides a direct answer to this easily vizualizable question. In the two-dimensional flow, this is described as obtaining a solution 'in the physical plane'.
It is possible, however, and sometimes advantageous in the twodimensional case, to set up the differential equations in terms of position as a function of velocity. One asks now at what position x,y in the flow field will given velocity components u,v be found (Figure 1b) ? The problem here has been transformed into the so-called 'hodograph plane'. Solution of the resulting hodograph equations provides results that are difficult to visualize directly in physical terms. To this end, one must additionally transform the results back to the physical plane. The attraction of the hodograph transformation is that the nonlinear differential equations of two-dimensional compressible flow used in the physical plane, both in the original and in the thin-aerofoil approximation, turn into more potentially solvable linear equations in the hodograph plane.
Before World War II the basic idea of the hodograph method was wellknown mainly to European theoretical aerodynamicists or to those with European training. It was described, though not applied to the transonic (Tietjens, 1929: 164-74) and Adolf Busemann in Braunschweig had applied it to the high-speed flow of gases in 1937. Toward the end of WW II a significant step in its application was taken in Germany by Gottfried Guderley, a colleague of Busemann at Braunschweig. (Guderley was later brought to the USA through 'Operation Paperclip' to work for the Air Materiel Command at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio.
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) Guderley studied the linear differential equation that resulted from applying the hodograph transformation to the nonlinear thin-aerofoil equation for transonic flow and recognized it as one that had already been investigated in mathematical detail in 1923 by a pure mathematician, the Italian Francesco Tricomi (1923) .
Naturally, Tricomi's goals and purposes were very different from Guderley's. Tricomi had no concern for physical problems and was interested in the theory of differential equations as such. 10 For him the idea of the hodograph equation as the transformation of a physical equation did not exist; it had the purely mathematical property that it was the simplest possible, second-order, linear, partial differential equation of mixed type that could be written. In one half of the infinite region of solution in an abstract two-dimensional space, the equation was of 'elliptic' type; in the other, 'hyperbolic'. Purely elliptic or hyperbolic equations had by Tricomi's time been studied independently in great detail, but equations of mixed type had never before been examined. That it was of mixed type was, of course, significant for the link Guderley and others would later see with the problem of transonic flow. Tricomi, however, had no concern for practical problems. His interest was to show that (a) under certain specified abstract boundary 11 conditions, a solution of the equation, if it exists, must be unique and (b) such a solution does indeed exist. (The latter is much the more difficult, and hence taken up second.) Proof of existence he considered accomplished when he succeeded, by lengthy and complex mathematical reasoning, in laying out a scheme whereby a solution could be arrived at by standard mathematical operations, even though the operations were not actually carried out. For a pure mathematician dealing with partial-differential equations, the interesting and challenging questions had then been answered and the problems of mathematical interest solved. He had no need to solve a specific problem and obtain quantitative results. In proceeding in this fashion, Tricomi was addressing the kinds of questions that pure mathematicians had been asking about other types of differential equations since the mid-1800s.
Guderley viewed the Tricomi equation very differently, seeing in it far more than its position within a mathematical classification of types of linear differential equations. For him it had a physical meaning derived from the basic differential equations that express the physics of fluid flow in the language of mathematics. In particular, it was a potentially useful transformation of the nonlinear thin-aerofoil equations of compressible flow. Tricomi had set down his equation for purely mathematical purposes; Guderley arrived at it as a tool to solve theoretical-aerodynamic problems.
In discussing the Tricomi equation in the compressible-flow context, an important circumstance needs to be understood. The hodograph plane of Figure 1b can be pictured alternatively (Figure 2a ) in terms of coordinates V,θ where radial lines from the point O of zero velocity have length proportional to the magnitude (speed) V of a velocity whose position is being sought and direction θ parallel to that of the velocity in question. In the hodograph before the thin-aerofoil approximation, lines of constant V thus appear as concentric circles, one of which is where V has the (known, constant) value a* at which the speed of flow and speed of sound are equal. Subsonic speeds -the elliptic portion of the hodograph -lie within this sonic circle; supersonic speeds -the hyperbolic portion -lie outside. In this pre-approximation situation, the compressible-flow equation does not reproduce the Tricomi equation. Our present discussion concerns the situation in the hodograph after the thin-aerofoil approximation ( Figure  2b ). In the approximation process, θ is assumed small and V is measured by a small departure (to be defined later) from the sonic speed a*. The locus where V = a* now transforms into the infinite vertical straight line through intersection point A of the coordinate system η,θ. It thus makes sense now to speak of an elliptic (subsonic) and a hyperbolic (supersonic) 'half' of the hodograph. The approximation amounts mathematically to studying flows in which all features of consequence take place in the vicinity of point A of Figure 2a Guderley's view of the Tricomi equation was what one might expect from an applied mathematician whose original training had been as an engineer and who was operating within a context of purposes defined by 12 He was very much aware of the need for quantitative results of the kind that could be used by designers and hence of the need to find solutions in terms of analytical operations that could be carried through in detail. At the same time, he found the properties of the required mathematics of interest in their own right. The combined nature of his interests gave rise in the late 1940s to reports that gave attention equally to physical and mathematical concerns. The first, in October 1947, used qualitative mathematical arguments to analyze several hitherto puzzling transonic-flow situations. In this report, Guderley focused more on physical structure than mathematical detail and used the mathematics to reveal things about the physics. The second report, in June 1948, gave a sophisticated, detailed mathematical analysis of a class of singular solutions of the Tricomi equation. (A singular solution is a solution for the immediate neighborhood of a point or line at which the function being solved for, or one of its mathematical derivatives, does not exist, i.e. becomes infinite.) The discussion here indicated the types of physical problems in which the singular solutions could supply a useful component for a solution by superposition. In this report, however, as Guderley remarked, 'the emphasis lies in the development of the general [mathematical] properties of the singularities'. In a still later report, in November 1950, Guderley and an American colleague Hideo Yoshihara returned to an immediately practical problem by using one of the singular solutions as a basis for quantitative solution for the performance in flight at Mach 1 of a double-wedge aerofoil at zero angle of attack (or incidence) to the oncoming flow. (This was made from two straight wedges joined back to back at the aerofoil's mid-chord and was symmetrical about the chord line.) For this transonic problem, the flow is subsonic over the front wedge and supersonic over the rear with a transition region between. This was the first analytical solution ever for the transonic properties of an aerofoil with no approximations beyond those of the thin-aerofoil theory (Guderley, 1947 (Guderley, , 1948 Guderley & Yoshihara, 1950) .
Numerical Methods
Though Guderley was well aware of practical utility, we have called him an 'applied mathematician', that is, someone who sees the physical problem more as an exercise in mathematics than as something needing a ready utilitarian solution. He explored a range of problems and non-physical solutions and evinced little interest in experimental work or in making a comparison between his calculations and experimental results. The center of gravity of his interests lay clearly in the mathematics. Walter Vincenti, by contrast, working at the Ames Laboratory of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics near San Francisco, was clearly an engineer. He addressed only the problem immediately at hand, brought in only such mathematics as necessary, and would later go on to direct wind-tunnel tests for experimental comparison.
Vincenti's goal was to bridge the gap between Guderley's result for Mach 1 (which he knew to be pending) and the higher flight speed at which the flow becomes everywhere supersonic and the existing linear solution was applicable. In this transonic range, a curved, detached shock wave stands ahead of the aerofoil leading edge (like the detached bow wave ahead of a ship at slow speeds); much as in Guderley's problem, the flow over the front wedge is then subsonic. Guderley had shown that this situation gives a well-defined problem in the hodograph plane. The boundary conditions created by the shock wave, however, make this problem more difficult mathematically than that at Mach 1.
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To address these forbidding difficulties, Vincenti used purely numerical methods whereby the relevant differential equation is approximated by a set of algebraic, finite-difference equations at a network of discrete, appropriately placed points throughout the region of solution in the hodograph. In Vincenti's work, this resulted in hundreds of simultaneous algebraic equations that had to be solved by an iterative, step-by-step numerical process. Such techniques were, however, well developed and familiar to engineers in the 1940s and 1950s under the name of 'relaxation methods'. For American aerodynamicists the work of Howard Emmons at Harvard had pointed the way with his calculations in the physical plane of the mixed sub-and supersonic flow in a converging-diverging nozzle (Emmons, 1944 (Emmons, , 1946 . Application of relaxation techniques to the wedge aerofoil proved in the hodograph plane proved free of fundamental problems, though it did require considerable trial and error, a great deal of computation time by assistants using hand-operated calculators, and some innovation in the numerical methods.
For our later discussion, one of the last is noteworthy. In his work, Emmons had encountered a convergence problem where the step-by-step relaxation process appeared at first to converge within the supersonic region, but then began to diverge. This presented a problem in judging where to stop the relaxation process and a corresponding uncertainty in the result. A similar problem soon showed up in the supersonic region of the hodograph representation for the wedge. By exploiting the linear nature of the Tricomi equation and some special properties of the supersonic region in the wedge problem, and by using a further equation he found in Tricomi's work, Vincenti was able to replace the pertinent supersonic region of the hodograph by an equivalent integral relation along the sonic line. This was numerically cumbersome but clearly convergent. It was also possible to assess the numerical 'truncation error' of the algebraic relaxation process by seeing how close the embedded subsonic region came to closure at its upper apex when the hodograph result was transformed back to the physical plane.
Vincenti and an assistant published the results in two papers with the same general title: 'Transonic Flow Past a Wedge Profile with Detached Bow Wave' (Vincenti & Wagoner, 1951) . The first of these, subtitled 'General Analytical Method and Final Calculated Results', focused on the translation of the physical problem into mathematical terms plus a detailed discussion of the final physical results. The aim here was to retain as far as possible the interest of a general, aeronautical-engineering audience by omitting the intimidating mathematical and computational details. These were relegated to the second paper, 'Details of Analysis', for the more specialized audience interested in such things.
Although the approach adopted by Vincenti was enormously labor intensive, and took a team of two or three aides nearly a year to carry through, it provided four solutions and corresponding values for the drag coefficient of the double-wedge aerofoil. Added to the fifth value already calculated by Guderley, these were sufficient to span the gap above Mach 1. Almost immediately, experimental confirmation of the calculated results was achieved at Caltech by Arthur Bryson, a student of Hans Liepmann, through tests of wedge aerofoils in a small, special transonic wind tunnel (Liepmann & Bryson, 1950) .
Soon after, a corresponding gap at flight speeds below Mach 1 was bridged by, first, Julian Cole at Caltech (Cole, 1951) and then by Leon Trilling at MIT (Trilling, 1953) . To solve this still more difficult problem, additional approximations beyond those of thin-aerofoil theory had to be made, fewer by Trilling than by Cole. These results too were verified by Bryson's measurements. The totality of the findings gave, for the first time, theoretical results for an aerofoil through the entire transonic range. The lingering fear that there might be no stable transition across the 'sound barrier' was beginning to be put to rest.
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Analytical Concerns
The foregoing sections provide a basis for our inquiry. The case study shows clear differences in the view and use of 'the same equation' by the pure mathematician and the applied mathematician and engineer. The pure mathematician sees it as an object of interest in its own right and examines abstract matters such as mathematical typology and its influence on the existence and uniqueness of solutions. The applied mathematician and engineer see it as representative of a complex physical process and uses it to solve practical physical problems. The difference is unmistakable (and will appear still more explicitly later).
Kármán's and Birkoff's stereotypes, however different their polemical intent, agree essentially, though less obviously, with each other and with the case study. Kármán speaks specifically of 'the separation of pure and applied mathematics [that] began to appear in the nineteenth century' (p. 2). Birkhoff uses the term 'pure mathematician' frequently (for example on p. 5), and though he does not mention applied mathematics explicitly, he exemplifies it himself by moving from his usual pure mathematics to his analysis of mathematical-physical 'paradoxes'.
All three examples -Kármán's, Birkhoff's, and the case study -thus recognize a fundamental difference between present-day pure and applied mathematics. It is this difference that underlay the 'national debate' referred to in the introduction. The difference has become institutionalized in the establishment of separate majors in university mathematics departments, in the formation of separate departments of pure and applied mathematics in such leading universities as the University of Cambridge in Great Britain and the California Institute of Technology in the United States, and in the designation of departments in nonacademic research institutions. The only disparity among our three examples is that Kármán and Birkoff nowhere speak of a secondary difference between applied mathematicians and engineers, whereas our case study follows present-day practice by employing such distinction.
In themselves, none of the foregoing findings is likely to be surprising or difficult to accept. If we were interested only in describing the mathematical situation, we could say that our task had been accomplished, so that we could bring the discussion to a close. Since, we are interested in understanding it, however, this would be a superficial response. It may be more profitable to suppose that the full understanding available from the stereotypes and case study has yet to be brought to the surface. We must not forget that, while Kármán's and Birkoff's ideas were aligned with one another as indicated above, there was nevertheless a significant contradiction between them. For Kármán, the differentiation between pure and applied mathematics was the product of a devaluation of physical intuition relative to deductive formalism. This had resulted from an historical process that could and should be put into reverse. For Birkhoff, that same process was to be seen as one in which the virtue of rigorous analysis had rightly been separated off from mere intuition. Far from needing reversal, it was in need of extension and enlargement by increasing the scope of deductive rigor and pushing back the ground occupied by intuitive physical reasoning. (The case study is silent on this matter.) Issues such as this suggest there may be more than meets the eye in the distinction between pure and applied mathematics.
To examine this possibility we will begin by examining the nature of the boundary this distinction implies. Is it a Kármán-like artifact of historical circumstance, or a Birkhoff-like fissure based, ultimately, on the objective difference between inductive and deductive reasoning? Is it something made by humans or something that humans must recognize? Is it, as Birkhoff argues, the failure of this recognition that lies behind the engineer's notion of 'physical reasoning' which, he says, is a 'confusion' that 'corrupts' their thinking (p. 37)? Questions such as these cannot be answered without reflecting on the idea of 'boundaries' in general. For simplicity our analysis will only deal with the relatively clear-cut boundary between 'pure' and 'applied mathematics' and ignore the secondary graduation between 'applied mathematician' and 'engineer'.
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N-and S-Boundaries
We can regard disciplinary boundaries as giving a 'map' of knowledge, 16 and we know that maps indicate different sorts of boundaries. A geological map will show the boundaries between, say, regions of limestone and regions of granite. A political map will show the boundaries between different nation states. Geological and political boundaries are both real but can be distinguished from one another by a simple thought experiment. Geological boundaries would still exist even if there were no geologists to map them, refer to them, symbolize them, represent them or talk about them. Political boundaries, by contrast, exist because people make them, that is, literally create them. It makes no sense to talk of a political boundary between two countries that, literally, nobody knew about. Its very existence depends on the role it plays in people's lives as they orient to it, learn about it, refer to it and talk about it.
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Following the sociologist Barry Barnes, we shall call boundaries (e.g. geological boundaries) that can be said to exist independently of our knowledge of them 'N-(for "natural") boundaries' and those (e.g. political boundaries) whose existence depends on our collective knowledge of them 'S-(for "social" or "self-referential")-boundaries'.
18 Is the boundary separating pure from applied and engineering mathematics an N-boundary or an S-boundary? The crucial question is whether the boundary exists independently of our knowledge of it and our talk about it. If it does then it does not matter whether its nature is physical or some other mode of objective existence, for example of the kind that might be supposed to belong to mathematical entities, logical truths, or rigorous and valid arguments. There is something to said for both the N and S options. Let us begin with the case for treating the disciplinary boundary as akin to a geological boundary, that is, as an N-type.
An N-Boundary?
There are three ways in which the disciplinary boundary between pure and applied mathematics might be treated as an independent object of discourse. The first is to focus on the knowing subject, the second on the known object and the third on the manner of its treatment. First, recall that even Kármán, with his sense of the contingency of the boundary, spoke of different 'mentalities' (and of how these mentalities 'necessarily diverged' in the age of codification). This looks as if it could be the basis for treating disciplinary boundaries as natural kinds. Pure and applied mathematicians might have different mind-sets that are as much independent objects of discourse as, say, two computer programs. Such mind-sets might even be innate tendencies. But even if mentalities are innate, Kármán's sense, and our own sense, of the many ways in which they may be combined in the history of mathematics works against the sufficiency of this line of argument. It is not clear how such psychological tendencies, on their own, could explain facts about disciplinary organization. Why could they not be combined within a single, unified mathematical discipline? Even if there were good evidence that mathematical aptitude exists in two, innately different types of mind, their selective recruitment into two, distinct cultural projects and disciplines, actually presupposes the boundaries in question. And we do not yet have an explanation of how the boundaries arose or what they consist in.
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A second, and more plausible, naturalistic basis for the boundary may be derived, not from the knowing subject, but from the object known. We may exploit the obvious fact that engineers make things (such as aircraft wings) and applied mathematicians formulate their problems by reference to the natural processes and human artifacts associated with them. Pure mathematicians, by contrast, do not concern themselves with material things. The variables in the equations of the first two groups thus have physical meaning; in the equations of the pure mathematician they do not. Here, arguably, is an objective difference; in one case there is independent reference, in the other case not. These two, different relationships to the material world themselves stand as phenomena that exist independently of discourse about them, that is, they too are N-phenomena.
This fundamental point can be emphasized by comparing the Tricomi equation as it appears in Tricomi's original work and as used by Vincenti. 20 The equation in Tricomi's mathematical treatise can be written (after purely formal mathematical substitutions to facilitate the comparision
Here X and Y are otherwise undefined independent variables, and Z is some function thereof that is to be solved for under some prescribed boundary conditions. The variables and the boundary conditions are all abstract quantities and have no physical connection. In Vincenti's application, the Tricomi equation as derived from physical considerations and the thin-aerofoil approximation appears as ∂
The independent variable introduced earlier in Figure 2b is related to the local speed V by
The constant γ has a value characteristic of the gas, and the difference Va* has been assumed small as explained earlier. The independent variable η, the local angle of inclination of the flow relative to the undisturbed stream, is also physically small, and the dependent variable ψ is a function of η and θ that is to be solved for and that has a constant (and different) value along each streamline. Symbols in the transonic equation thus have physical meaning; in Tricomi's pure-mathematical form they are abstract.
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The point is obviously correct and, when properly developed, plays a vital role in the story. It is important to realize, however, that, as it stands, such a difference in external reference does not adequately explain the existence of different disciplines. It may be a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient. If it were, how would Kármán's heroic age of mathematics have been possible? This was a period when practitioners did not differentiate themselves into two kinds in the manner taken for granted today. Even if one views Kármán's history with suspicion, the point still retains its force. That an object of study can be broken down into two kinds does not entail that our involvement with it has to be institutionalized as two, fundamentally different, academic pursuits. In the present case, they could be combined in a single, resultant mathematical discipline of the kind that Kármán felt was healthy and desirable.
Two of the three arguments for treating the boundary between pure and applied mathematicians as if it were a natural, N-type boundary have thus proven less than compelling. Before examining the third, let us look at the alternative approach. If we are not confronted by an N-boundary, are we confronted by an S-boundary?
An S-Boundary?
To say that disciplinary boundaries are S-boundaries is a version of the claim that they are 'conventional'. In this guise it may find ready acceptance, but claims about conventionality are easier to assent to than to analyze, and their full implications may not be appreciated. If the difference between applied and pure mathematicians is indeed a matter of convention then that difference can have no adequate grounds independent of our beliefs and no existence as an independent object of reference. It means that the boundary is brought into and kept in being precisely by activities such as those of Kármán and Birkhoff. Their talk about the boundary, for all their differences of opinion, becomes part of the very substance of the boundary itself, because the boundary is constituted by all the references to it. Their talk was therefore, in a sense, self-referential and self-validating. Even though they disagreed, they were actively helping to create the very object they were both discussing.
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Of course, lectures (such as Kármán's) and reflective or polemical passages in books (such as Birkhoff's) are only a small part of the overall process. High-visibility spokesmen play a role, but the boundary depends for its reality on all the manifold and subtle ways in which it is invoked. The boundary will be the by-product of all the taken-for-granted work done on either side of it. Most of this will be tacit rather than, as it was in the case of Kármán and Birkhoff, explicit. Suppose a researcher decides, as Guderley and Vincenti each did, to write up different aspects of his research in two different papers, where the emphasis and selection of material differs for different audiences. Here is a way of reinforcing a disciplinary boundary that, in its own quiet way, plays as significant a role as explicit assertions and arguments. That is, using the boundary can be as potent as mentioning it.
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Can such a theory really do justice to disciplinary boundaries? A positive answer may seem to be at odds with facts that have already been acknowledged. We have previously accepted that a 'natural', that is, an N-type differentiating feature, is the widely noted and obvious difference between those mathematical symbols with, and those without, physical reference. Our response was that this difference was real but it was not a sufficient explanation of disciplinary division. But to say the boundary is purely conventional or S-type would make it arbitrary. It would thus appear that neither approach, taken on its own, is sufficient to do justice to all the facts. Some principled, and empirically adequate, way must therefore be found to combine N-and S-processes.
A comparable situation arises with respect to national boundaries. These too do not typically exist as simply so many thoughts and words. There are material considerations to be brought into the picture over and above patterns of self-referential and self-reinforcing talk. Notoriously, crossing national boundaries often involves risking life and limb because there are physical barriers (both natural and artificial) to be surmounted. Let us pursue this analogous case for a moment and then bring the argument back to disciplinary boundaries. To do this we need to introduce another concept, that of 'salience'.
Salience and Game Theory
Suppose a river marks the boundary between two nation states. The river is real and cannot be wished or talked away. But not every river is a political boundary, and not every political boundary is a river. We must not confuse the 'river-as-physical-barrier' with the 'river-as-political-boundary'. It is the river qua boundary, not the river qua barrier, that needs to be understood. Its social status, not its physical form, is in question here, but the two are somehow bound together. What is their relation? Why, for example, do national boundaries -S-phenomena -often coincide with natural barriers (like rivers) -N-phenomena -if the two are so different in their essential natures?
Clearly there are important ways in which the properties of the river qua physical barrier and the river qua national boundary are linked, for example the river may make a national boundary easy to defend. More generally, because a national boundary ultimately exists in virtue of people's belief in its existence, sustaining such a boundary represents a problem of coordinating people's thoughts, utterances and intentions. It therefore depends on a successful solution to what game theorists call a 'coordination problem'. Prominent features of the natural environment can provide what is called a 'salient solution' to such a problem. A salient solution is one that is easily perceived, that is readily available to everyone, and that can be seen to be so available, so that any one person can be confident that others will be thinking in the same way. It points to a simple, obvious and shared solution to a problem of organizing and coordinating behavior.
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The competing claims of N-and S-processes can now be disentangled, at least for the case of national boundaries. Despite the significance of physical barriers, national boundaries remain S-phenomena. They are social constructs in that they depend for their existence on knowledge of, and belief in, their existence. The salient features of a physical barrier may, however, be exploited in order to facilitate this essentially social exercise of co-ordination and alignment of belief and reference. We can say that N-properties are put to use in the course of constructing a piece of social reality, an S-type boundary. Physical contingencies are being socially exploited, but this does not make the existence of the boundary a physical rather than a social phenomenon.
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Moving back to disciplinary boundaries, the same point can be made. Disciplinary boundaries are social realities though contingent physical or non-social realities may be exploited in creating and sustaining them. A division of labor may emerge separating activities with a material focus from those that can be presented as unsullied by such preoccupations. It would, however, be a mistake to think that the use of such non-social features in the construction meant that the boundary itself was basically of a non-social nature. The division of labor is, and remains, a social accomplishment.
Salient solutions do not have to be provided by, say, prominent features of the non-social context. They can be provided by traditions, by a shared knowledge of historical precedents, or by some pre-existing institutional arrangement that is widely known and can act as a shared, cultural reference point. The important thing about a salient solution is that it can be easily and generally known, and known to be known. Prominent natural features can play this role, but they are not unique in this respect. Prior achievements of a conventional or self-referential nature can also achieve salience.
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How do these considerations relate to mathematics? Consider the difference between following or applying a particular mathematical procedure P and providing a rigorous justification for it. Suppose there are two groups of mathematicians: group A (which contains Kármán) and group B (which contains Birkhoff). The members of A may see it to be in their advantage to press ahead with the application of P in the absence of any secure justification or, at least, any that would satisfy members of B.
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Conversely, members of B may define it as their special business to be mindful of such justifications and to ensure that their importance is duly recognized -along with the expertise of members of B in dealing with such matters. Intense interaction between members of the two groups would involve one or the other modifying these opinions and practices. If members of A are to meet the demands of members of B, they will have to suspend operations or, at least, divert resources into addressing the question of justification. If members of B are to live with members of A, they have got to convince the latter of the importance of justifying P or concede its practical irrelevance. In these circumstances, where transaction costs are high, members of both A and B might find it in their interest to cut down interaction and establish some sort of boundary between A-type and B-type activities (or, if 'establish' has too active and deliberate ring to it, allow such a boundary to grow by default). This would permit them to focus their energies and spend more time in rewarding encounters with those who share their sense of how best to proceed and which exemplars to follow. But how is behavior to be coordinated and interaction made coherent? There may be a salient solution. If the pragmatists fell into a preexisting professional sub-group while those interested in justification fall into another, or even if the users are spatially located in one institution or building and the justifiers in another, coordination would be easier.
Salience can also derive from the repetition of similar techniques and solutions. If members of A typically share a pragmatic stance towards P, Q, R and all similar procedures, while members of B typically demand their justification, then earlier responses create a precedent for the later ones. A policy and an accepted division of labor can emerge. Different traditions will be created and sustained by divergent interests. Famous spokesmen, such as Kármán and Birkhoff, perform a function precisely by helping to make certain solutions to the problem of coordination into salient solutions. This indeed is what we saw them doing, though in our case they were pulling in opposite directions as they sought to establish their preferred solutions.
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Extreme Solutions and Purity
Salience may also help address a residual worry about Kármán's ideal of a unified mathematics. Surely, a critic might say, there will be a built-in strain and hence something unnatural about trying to keep pure and applied mathematics together. Like oil and water, those activities using interpreted symbols with a physical reference would naturally separate out from those whose symbols are 'pure'. On this view the historical move towards a distinct pure and applied mathematics, which Kármán opposed, will be a tendency driven by the intrinsic nature of things. It will not be a mere social convention that might have turned out quite otherwise or that could be reversed.
Again the argument appears to push us towards N-rather than Sprocesses. Nevertheless, it is possible to analyze this process of disciplinary differentiation sociologically. To do this we need to introduce another concept from game theory, namely, the important sub-class of salient solutions that might be called 'extreme solutions '. 30 Consider two players, A and B, who cannot communicate, but who each have to pick an integer from the infinite set 1,2,3,4, etc. To win a shared prize they must pick the same number. How are they to succeed given each is choosing from an infinite range of possibilities? Formally the task is intractable, and the probability of success looks like zero. But the integer 1 is salient because of its extreme position. A may assume that B can see this and that B will be making the same assumption about A. B goes through the same steps, so they both choose 1 and win. The mechanism is highly general and operates in a variety of ways in complex, real-life circumstances.
Extreme solutions beckon even when a non-extreme solution might, in the abstract, be preferred. They may be the only ones around which it is possible to mobilise collective action. Suppose that those who prefer pure mathematics have no objection to sharing their professional identity or working environment with applied mathematicians, but do not wish to live too closely to too many of them. We may imagine a range of sensitivities on this issue. A given, mixed academic department might prove comfortable to many of the purists, but suppose those who are least comfortable move to seek out more congenial colleagues. This alters the proportions so that some of those who had previously felt comfortable now feel exposed. The process repeats itself and the extreme solution of complete segregation and division of labor turns out to be the only stable solution. Here is a social mechanism that could explain at least some of the forces pushing towards disciplinary differentiation. Talk of 'strain', and 'oil and water', turn out to be metaphors for the sociological forces that make it difficult for Kármán's heroic age to survive.
Historically, the causes of the initial unease that might drive the process described above will be rooted in cultural assumptions about the social meaning of 'purity' and 'utility'. 31 The concept of 'purity' associated with mathematics has been made to carry a range of subtly different ideological meanings at different times and places. These have ranged from mathematical purity as a symbol of spiritual significance to a more formalistic variant where purity symbolizes professional autonomy. The symbolism and snobbery of 'head' and 'hand' are woven, in a multitude of ways, into the texture of social life. 32 The emerging division of labor between 'pure' and 'applied' mathematics, whose formalistic consequences so worried Kármán, is an historical process that has long intrigued historians but its full sociological complexity is, perhaps, only now being appreciated. 33 Kármán's own efforts, directed towards unification rather than partition, had their immediate stimulus in the America of the 1940s but clearly drew on his Göttingen background. They were an expression of the ideological stance taken by the great mathematician Felix Klein 34 and an extension of Klein's fight to increase the status of the Technische Hochschulen and give technology, particularly aerodynamics, its rightful place in the university curriculum. 35 Our concern, however, is with one, local and recent manifestation of these longer-term trends and complex clashes of professional interest.
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The idea of social processes that exploit salient features of the natural, non-social environment has been introduced to help understand the construction of the disciplinary boundary between pure and applied mathematics. We began with the analogy between national and disciplinary boundaries and considered the case of the salient natural barrier put to social use. However, the exploitation of features of the natural world is not confined to the explicit task of constructing and policing of boundaries. Disciplinary boundaries are sustained by the totality of what goes on within the respective disciplines. We shall now illustrate this and show how the exploitation of physical contingency plays an important role within applied mathematics itself and, in particular, within transonic aerodynamics.
Exploiting Contingency
By virtue of the specific, physical meaning to their equations, applied mathematicians and engineers generally are able to exploit certain contingent features of the problem setting to guide the manipulation of the symbols. As in the number-guessing game, difficulties that seemed intractable from a formal standpoint become amenable to solution by reference to highly particular circumstances, circumstances given by the details of the artifacts and processes they are studying. Our case study gives examples of this process.
We have already mentioned that Vincenti was able to assess the 'truncation error' of his numerical approximation process by seeing how nearly the boundary of the enclosed subsonic region came to closure when the solution was transformed back to the physical plane from the hodograph plane. This was not a formal measure of convergence; it was an informal exploitation of the fact that the hodograph solution had a certain meaning when transformed to the physical plane.
A more basic set of difficulties arises in the setting up of an aerofoil problem in the hodograph. In general, to solve a differential equation in a portion of a plane, it is necessary to specify conditions along some boundary of that portion. Although the hodograph transformation has the desirable property of turning a nonlinear differential equation into a more convenient and tractable linear equation, it has some problematic features with regard to these 'boundary conditions'. A crucial one has to do with conditions at the surface of the aerofoil. These are easily written for an aerofoil in the physical plane, where the position of the boundary (i.e. the shape of the aerofoil) is given ab initio. The boundary condition at points on the aerofoil surface -that the flow be tangential to the surface -can thus be applied, in appropriate mathematical terms, at a known boundary. Such is not the case in the hodograph plane, where the position of the transformed boundary (i.e. the locus of the velocities at the surface of the aerofoil) can not in general be specified at the outset but must be found as part of the solution, a prohibitively difficult task in the days before highspeed numerical computers. One situation where it can be sufficiently prescribed, however, is the forward wedge of the double-wedge aerofoil, as in the problems addressed by Guderley and Vincenti. Here, for a specified wedge angle, the velocities on the boundary in the physical plane all have that same direction; they therefore lie somewhere along the radial straight line having that known direction in the hodograph. 37 (See Figure 2a. ) Other contingencies help set the extent of this line, that is, its beginning and ending. As described earlier, in the problems in question the flow over the front wedge is subsonic. Since the double-wedge airfoil is symmetrical about the chord line and at zero angle of attack, the flow field must be symmetrical too, and the central streamline approaching the sharp leading edge is a straight line. In the assumed non-viscous gas, this streamline can be imagined replaced by a solid wall, and the flow on one side of the aerofoil and in the vicinity of the leading edge can be seen as like a subsonic flow in a concave corner. But classical incompressible-flow analysis of such a flow, which should be at least qualitatively accurate for the very low local Mach numbers of the present case, shows that the flow along the central streamline may be expected to come to a halt at the corner. The transformation of the leading edge thus lies at the zero-speed point (the origin O of the coordinate system) of the hodograph. Hence, that is where the radial line must begin.
Where the radial line ends can similarly be specified. Here the physics of the situation, known in this case from a combination of theoretical and empirical evidence, requires that the subsonic flow along the surface of the front wedge reach sonic speed precisely at the ridge; it follows that the radial line must end at the sonic circle. It can further be reasoned (as confirmed by experiment) that the speed of the supersonic flow rounding the ridge itself, increases in a known multi-valued fashion right at the ridge. It follows that this singular point in the physical plane maps in the hodograph into a known curve beginning at the sonic-circle V = a* end of the radial line and extending into the supersonic region. As it happens, this curve in the thin-aerofoil approximation was precisely the same as that chosen by Tricomi, for purely mathematical reasons, to bound the hyperbolic portion of the region of concern for his uniqueness proof. It was this fortunate circumstance that enabled Vincenti to use an equation from Tricomi to replace the hyperbolic (supersonic) region with an integral relation along the sonic line and thus obtain convergence of his numerical process.
Further examples could be cited from other portions of the boundary in the present problem or from numerous other problems. 38 But these should be enough to make our point. We thus see how contingencies, such as those shown here, can be used to help set up (and solve) a mathematical representation of a physical problem. Throughout the applied-mathematical process, the routine of reasoning and symbol manipulation is thus guided by the physical meaning of the situation. So taken for granted is reasoning of this kind that its full significance, and the need to describe its detailed operation, may easily be overlooked.
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Rigor
It is now time to confront the third, and perhaps most powerful, of the ways in which the difference between pure mathematics and applied mathematics might be treated as an independent object of discourse. Birkhoff's central appeal was to the role of deductive rigor. Although he did not give an explicit definition of rigor, it is clear that it is identified with compelling, demonstrative reasoning. Reasoning which is not fully demonstrative would count as non-rigorous. The crucial question, therefore, is whether this distinction is an absolute one and whether it can be said to be grounded in the nature of some independent mathematical or logical 'reality'. If we can make sense of this picture of rigor then the disciplinary boundary around pure mathematics (which is assumed to enclose only rigorous reasoning) corresponds to some independently existing feature of 'mathematical reality'. That the 'reality' in question is of an 'abstract' kind makes it no less real, on this view, than the material world itself. It would still give the boundary the character of an N-rather than an Sphenomenon.
This picture, which is usually implicit rather than explicit, is so common that it deserves to be called the standard model of rigor. Nevertheless, we suggest that it is open to question. Everyone accepts the need to distinguish between an argument's being what we call 'right' and its merely 'seeming right', but advocates of the standard model go far beyond such pragmatic needs. They put a metaphysical gloss on such distinctions and suggest that there is some endpoint of total or complete rigor. They invite us to think of pure mathematics as a description of a mysterious realm populated by strange, 'abstract' objects. The temptation, then, is to think in terms of an hierarchy of disciplines that should command greater or lesser respect depending on their supposed closeness to the true description of these 'objects'. 40 In place of such speculations we would recommend a more modest, historical account of rigor. This may be called the 'interaction model' and does not depend on metaphor and metaphysics. Rigor is not glossed as conformity to some supposed mathematical reality. Instead, it is seen as arising from critical arguments conducted by persons with specific goals and aims. A line of reasoning is called 'rigorous' if it passes the critical scrutiny of an interacting community of accepted experts. Such scrutiny will vary in its intensity, direction and character depending on who is party to the interaction, the concerns that are expressed, and the goals that are being furthered. While, on the metaphysical model, rigor is alleged to have an absolute basis, on the interaction model it is relative to the norms sustained by the relevant community. 41 Advocates of the metaphysical model of rigor do, of course, see a role for critical scrutiny but give it their own special gloss. It is the means -the instrument -by which 'mathematical reality' is uncovered. Critical argument exposes error and draws us nearer to ultimate truth. In the interaction-of-experts model, critical discourse plays more than this instrumental role; it plays a constitutive role.
We can understand Kármán as implicitly inviting us to adopt some version of the interaction view when he spoke of rigor as 'codification'. Just as one can codify a set of legal practices and precedents, so one can codify a set of mathematical techniques and results. This process is a form of rationalization. It does not uncover hitherto hidden, but really existing, connections; it actually manufactures those connections in the hope of making some body of practice more coherent. The purpose is to remove impediments to smooth patterns of interaction and co-ordination. Admittedly, the rhetoric and justificatory ideology that attends the processes of codification and critical argument may present them in a metaphysical and absolutist light (as making explicit what was already there, but implicit), but such a picture is not a necessary part of the activity itself.
Following Kármán's lead we should not speak of engineers 'failing' to achieve the rigor characteristic of mathematicians as if there were a unique set of standards of acceptable reasoning. They are not doing the same thing as pure mathematicians but doing it in a weaker, easier or dilute form. It is better to say they are simply doing something different. Where there are different groups who use mathematics, these groups are at liberty to erect their own dimensions of cognitive propriety consonant with the different patterns of interaction they are trying to sustain. These standards, which are internal to the group, derive from the tasks accepted and confronted by its members. These define the goals, and it is relative to these that specialpurpose concepts have been evolved. Such concepts are not invented or assessed as a matter of whim, but are cultivated and cherished on pragmatic grounds as instruments to pursue shared goals. Just as different tools have been evolved in order to allow craftsmen to carry out different tasks in, say, woodwork and masonry, so different cognitive techniques emerge in the different areas where mathematics is employed. Just as there is no single standard against which all tools can be measured, so there is no single standard against which all mathematical procedures are to be measured.
To indicate the existence of an alternative to the metaphysical model of rigor is not, of course, to refute that model. Indeed, there is no decisive refutation to be had. Those who find the metaphysical model natural or attractive should, however, be aware of the position in which they place themselves. They should know that a satisfactory account of the ontology and epistemology of mathematics has never been provided from the metaphysical standpoint. Any attempt to render the account precise rapidly becomes embroiled in contentious philosophical and metaphysical claims. Allegiance to it therefore carries a cost, though it is often hidden by the popularity, and taken for granted character, of the metaphysics.
The Engineer as Philosopher
One of the few attempts to develop the interaction model of rigor in detail is to be found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1978) . Wittgenstein was himself trained as an engineer at the Technische Hochschule in Charlottenburg, so it is no surprise that one of the most telling comparisons of his later philosophy was between the diversity of uses to which symbols are put, and the diversity of tools in a toolbox. (Wittgenstein, 1953: para. 11 ) Wittgenstein also spoke of mathematics as a collection of different 'language games', or symbolic interactions based on different techniques, conventions, customs and practices. These do not stand to one another in necessary relations of dependence, and they do not form an hierarchy of levels where some are deeper and more fundamental than others. Rather, all the different techniques are on a par with one another (Wittgenstein, 1978: pt. VI, para. 16 ).
Wittgenstein fully shared Kármán's opposition to 'formalist' tendencies in mathematics. Indeed, he developed his ideas in reaction to one of the most detailed formulations that has ever been given to the metaphysical model of rigor, namely the 'logicist' program of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. In their writings, the ultimate in rigor is provided by formal, symbolic logic that is said to provide the 'foundation' on which the rest of mathematics is built. Wittgenstein saw this as a disastrous misconception that rendered invisible the real and important differences between symbolic techniques. For him mathematical logic had no special, foundational status, but was just one branch of mathematics amongst others. Wittgenstein's pragmatic and use-centered notion of meaning culminated in the idea that mathematical relations are modeled on the empirical relations between material objects. Symbolic operations take their meaning from our experience of the concrete manipulation of things. Certain of these concrete operations are then given a special status. They are, in fact, institutionalized and become basic models and patterns with which we reason, mathematically, by analogy. (Bloor, 1983: chaps 5 & 6) Three points deserve notice. First, this approach belongs to a tradition. The version of that tradition perhaps best known to philosophers is associated with the name of J.S. Mill. Mill tried, in a simple way, to develop an empiricist theory of mathematics His efforts were met with scorn by Frege, who dismissed his 'gingerbread and pebble arithmetic' as only suitable for the nursery and an affront to the dignity of mathematics (Frege, 1959: vii) . Despite Frege, this is the line taken by Wittgenstein, though Wittgenstein replaces Mill's essentially psychological stance with a sociological one. 42 Second, however offensive this approach may seem to some, it helps remove the great mystery of why mathematics is applicable to the physical world. On the metaphysical view, application is deeply problematic; on Wittgenstein's view it is a natural consequence of the empirical origin of all mathematical concepts. 43 This grounding of symbolic operations in conventionalized forms of concrete operations, literally in the manipulation of material objects, may be seen as a further instance of what we have called 'exploiting contingency'. Third, if Wittgenstein is right, empirical reference of some kind, along with the appropriate conventions governing its employment, underlies the use of all mathematical symbols, however abstract or pure they may seem. Even if we confine our attention to the most elementary and fundamental truths of pure arithmetic, whose logical or set-theoretic proof seems to be wholly independent of empirical reference, we shall find that the manipulation of the symbols of the proof actually depends on tacit assumptions of an empirical and inductive nature. For example, a rigorous, Russell-style proof of 2 + 2 = 4, using all the refined apparatus of formal logic, will, on inspection, be seen to turn on the residual, empirical character of the symbols. The outcome of the symbolic manipulations will be no more secure, and of no higher cognitive status, than the manipulation of Mill's pebbles. 44 Wittgenstein was challenging widespread assumptions about the autonomy and priority of 'pure' mathematics by making 'applied' processes, and the possession of external reference, cognitively and ontologically basic. The usual, pragmatic differentiation between those symbols with, and those without, external reference (such as we have ourselves used) therefore stands in need of refinement. Ultimately all mathematical symbols have external reference, but there are still distinctions to be drawn between different kinds, and different degrees, of external reference. There is no longer a single, uni-dimensional question of presence versus absence. But while the 'impurity' of applied mathematics is openly and honestly acknowledged, the 'purity' of pure mathematics, which is at best relative, is all too often treated as absolute and shrouded in mystery -something that never failed to evoke Wittgenstein's suspicions.
To develop the interaction model of rigor in a way consonant with Wittgenstein's philosophy would involve a careful study of exactly how the word 'rigor' is used in different contexts. We should not assume that the word means the same thing on different occasions and in different social settings. The suggestion here is not that the uses of the word might be wholly unconnected but that they would display no more than an overall 'family resemblance' (Wittgenstein, 1953: para. 67 ). We cannot assume in advance that they will all share a single, essential, common feature.
Consider, in this light, the following passage from Hans Liepmann and Arthur Bryson's experimental study of 'Transonic Flow Past Wedge Sections', the paper that provided early experimental support for the theoretical calculation of transonic flow over wedge aerofoils. Liepmann and Bryson cited a sequence of papers by Kármán, Busemann, Guderley, Yoshihara, and Vincenti. They commented on a certain feature of these papers that they characterized by the word 'rigor'. Thus:
The cited theoretical papers have the following in common: that they deal with the problem in transonic [thin-aerofoil] approximation but are rigorous within this frame. That is, no further simplifying assumptions are introduced, and in Guderley's and especially Vincenti's work the Tricomi equation in the hodograph is actually solved under the prescribed boundary conditions. Hence, these papers differ considerably from others not cited here, where other simplifying assumptions have been made, such as an assumed shape of the shock, etc. (Liepmann & Bryson, 1950: 746) .
The notion of rigor invoked in this passage does not point to an ultimate standard provided by pure mathematics or the set theory or formal logic taken to underlie it. Rather, it points to the desire for an approach (even an approximate one) that yields principled results about important and concrete features of an empirical situation, for example the shape of shock waves. To be rigorous is to avoid certain sorts of ad hoc assumption. It is not the absence of simplifying assumptions as such that counts, but the kind of assumptions made and their contribution to the particular goals of the investigation. Here we see a measure of rigor that is appropriate to the language-game of transonic aerodynamics but foreign to that of other areas and, in particular, foreign to the language-game of 'pure' mathematics.
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Summary and Conclusions
The opposing views of Kármán and Birkhoff and the particulars of the case study lead to fundamental questions. Is mathematics grounded in material reality or in logical processes (which are to be thought of as abstract and non-material)? Does mathematics belong to the realm of natural contingency or some alleged realm of supernatural necessity? If we choose the first answer to this pair of questions, then the history and the day-to-day activity of mathematics must be thought of as historically variable and conventional. If we choose the second, then such variations merely represent the more or less adequate reflection of some underlying, absolute necessity, such as the demands of a formal and universal 'rigor'. Such questions cannot be answered by case studies alone because general arguments are needed to tackle the big issues head-on. Nevertheless, case studies can help us think concretely about such themes and can help us isolate some of their more tractable aspects, for example the character of disciplinary boundaries and the differentiating features of the subdisciplines which they mark out. On the big questions, we have followed the lead of Wittgenstein and accepted the first of the two basic options mentioned above, that is, Kármán's rather than Birkhoff's. We have sought to regard the case study of transonic aerodynamics accordingly. Our specific conclusions are:
• Disciplinary boundaries are, indeed, basically 'conventional' in that they depend on processes having a self-referential (S-type) character, that is, referential processes with no independent object of discourse. Kármán's hope for the restoration of the 'heroic age', where pure and applied mathematics will once again form a unity (and applied and engineering mathematics will set the tone for the overall enterprise), is, indeed, a possible arrangement of human affairs. In so far as it would be difficult to achieve, this would be for historical and sociological reasons. The problem should not be located in the alleged essence of mathematics or the essential characteristics of its different parts. The forces sustaining differentiation are historical contingencies not timeless necessities.
• Although disciplinary boundaries are conventional, their maintenance can, and often does, exploit independent, naturalistic (N-type) features of the environment. The game-theoretic idea of 'salience' shows how N-and S-processes can be combined to solve problems of social coordination and cognitive organization. In this way, it was possible to synthesize apparently opposing facts about the basis of disciplinary boundaries and generate hypotheses about the way in which physical reality is implicated in conventionalized, symbolic and rule-bound modes of understanding.
• It is uncontroversial to say that, in the case of applied mathematics, the symbols carry an empirical meaning and reference which is absent in the case of pure mathematics. Exactly how the concrete reference of the one is related to the abstract meaning of the other is more often assumed than subject to detailed, factual investigation. In our case study, the significance of an equation, such as the Tricomi equation, does not reside simply in its symbolic form but rather in its role within what Wittgenstein called a 'language game'. The 'game' is the context of associations and activities in which mathematical symbols are placed by their users and which sanction specific sorts of symbolic manipulation. The 'game' metaphor was part of Wittgenstein's effort to reexpress ideas that are sometimes stated in terms of 'rules' and sometimes in terms of 'conventions'. Notice that games are realities sustained by the player's knowledge and beliefs about the game itself. They are thus paradigmatic cases of self-referring, S-type processes.
• Some of those who used the Tricomi equation thought of it as having a position in an abstract, classificatory scheme while others thought of it as emerging from the description of a physical process. Those who adopted these respective orientations diverged in their behavior because they read different things into the symbols. In the case of applied mathematics, the line by line manipulation of a symbol may depend on the exploitation of contingent features of the empirical situation under analysis, that is to say, on a combination of S-type and N-type processes. We have sought to illustrate this in the case study.
• Standard accounts of the relation of pure and applied mathematics that depend on the notion of 'rigor' can be challenged and, indeed, inverted. Arguably, there are as many kinds of rigor as there are expert communities. Rigor will not be an absolute property but something to be understood as relative to the goals and interests of those communities. The word 'rigor' can itself be identified as an S-predicate, that is, an evaluative word describing a reality that has no existence external to the judgement and practices of its competent users. Rather than applied mathematics being seen, as it so often is, as a dilute form of pure mathematics, pure mathematics might be seen on this basis as an etiolated form of applied mathematics. Ultimately, it too depends, to a minimal but vitally important extent, on a body of taken-for-granted empirical considerations whose relevance is socially sustained, that is, kept in play by S-processes.
Notice how the 'exploitation of contingency' appears in different guises and different forms throughout the analysis of the case study. It appears whether we are talking about the creation of disciplinary boundaries, the details of mathematical work in transonic aerodynamics or, following Wittgenstein, the basis for manipulating even the most abstract seeming symbols that enter into the foundational proofs of pure arithmetical truths. Obviously, the theme of 'exploiting contingency' is in need of further analysis and exemplification. Nevertheless, we believe sufficient has been said to show the value and potential of such an inquiry.
Postscript
One of the authors of this paper (DB) is a sociologist, the other (WGV) is an aeronautical engineer with historical interests. The paper originated from extended and intensive discussion of an historical treatment of our transonic case study published several years ago by the engineering half of our duo. A reader wanting more historical and mathematical detail may consult Vincenti (1997) . We have tried to go beyond a merely interdisciplinary exchange of views (such as may occur in a seminar or across a luncheon table). Rather than simply contributing our respective parts to the end-product, our attempt was to make joint and multidisciplinary decisions about the content and production of the paper. In the words of a chemistry colleague of WGV at Stanford, 'Our aim was to make, not a mixture, but a compound'. Our hope was that we should in this way gain more than if we accepted a mere division of labor, or simply agreed to disagree. We come away from the study with a mutual, much deepened appreciation of how intimidating and complex is the interplay of technical and social matters when looked at in multidisciplinary detail. To what extent the written end-product has benefited from our collaboration is for others to judge. In the present climate of opinion, however, science and technology studies might well function as the site for more such multidisciplinary efforts. Perhaps some of those who feel themselves to be on opposite sides in the current conflicts about the social study of science and technology may care to make a similar experiment. mathematical elaboration of Maxwell's electromagnetic theory and in the 20th century was finally given a rigorous formulation. Heaviside had to fight a war on two fronts. On the one side he attacked 'Cambridge mathematicians' and on the other the so-called 'practical men' in the telegraph industry who opposed Maxwell's work and the trend towards ever more mathematical theories. See Lützen (1979) and Hunt (1983) . 7. Kármán is not wholly clear about how the 'always' present difference of viewpoint between the engineer and mathematician is to be reconciled in the new heroic age or how it was reconciled in the past. Presumably there can be different orientations amongst practitioners who see themselves as sharing a common set of mathematical resources and contributing to a single body of mathematical knowledge. There is diversity within an over-arching unity. The renewal Kármán hoped for has not, however, taken place. 8. See note 1 9. For an account of some of the complex politics behind the employment of German scientists in the USA. at that time, see Lasby (1975) . 10. Later Tricomi was to collaborate with a theoretical aerodynamicist and produce a joint text. See Ferrari & Tricomi (1962) . In this book, as stated in the preface, Tricomi wrote only the chapter on existence, uniqueness and other mathematical matters. The very nature of the collaboration thus strengthens our point. 11. These conditions were different from those of the aerofoil problem and had no physical significance. 12. We shall regard Guderley as typifying the applied mathematician though a certain element of arbitrariness is involved in such classification. In WVG's extended study, Guderley is spoken of as a 'research engineer' doing 'essentially applied mathematics' (see Vincenti, 1997, p. 845 Bowker, vol. 3, 1998, 440. 13 . Uniqueness, but not existence, of the solution to this problem has been proven by the Russian mathematician F. Frankl (1945) . This result was reassuring, but the decision to attempt a solution was in no way dependent on it. 14. This is an appropriate place to address one of the concerns of an anonymous referee.
Our paper is clearly rooted in the sociology of knowledge but where, asked the referee, is the typical stress on the interpretive flexibility of experimental results? 'For instance, how unproblematic do the authors want to make the confirmation of theory by experiment . . .?' Our position is that, as Pierre Duhem established in 1914 in his Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (Duhem, 1954) , all experimental results are potentially open to negotiation (because they all involve auxiliary assumptions as well as the hypothesis under investigation). Adjustment in the surrounding network of concepts can often remove anomalies and apparent disconfirmations and, conversely, can be used to cause trouble for an apparent confirmation. This powerful general principle does not, however, tell us anything about the response to any particular experimental result on any particular occasion. It does not tell us if that result will be perceived as problematic or unproblematic. Empirically we should expect to find cases at all points of the spectrum of possibilities. Interpretive flexibility is therefore consistent with (some) confirmations being accepted as straight forward and convincing. In the present case the confirmation was indeed accepted as clear-cut. This is offered as a factual report of a specific episode. It does not, we hope, betray methodological innocence on our part. In this regard it is worth noting that elsewhere in the experimental studies associated with the transonic realm there were cases where the fit between prediction and measurement was excellent -but it was so good as to arouse suspicion of an artifact. These suspicions later proved to be well-founded. 15. A matter of terminology may be worth noting. Persons dealing with practical problems can be either an 'applied mathematician' if their concern is primarily with the mathematical aspects of the problem, or a 'doer' (for example 'engineer', 'economist', etc.) in the field in question if their primary interest is in the practical outcome. A person doing 'applied mathematics' is thus not always referred to as 'applied mathematician'. We have followed this common, if potentially ambiguous, scheme throughout. Of course, even the three-fold distinction of pure, applied and engineering mathematics is but part of a wider picture in which different sub-groups and factions abound. Engineering itself is divided into civil engineering, structural engineering, electrical engineering, production engineering and so forth with specialists in heating, hydraulics, strength of materials often having their own journals and societies. Our focus should not be read as a denial or dismissal of these over-arching complexities. 16. For a wide-ranging study of boundary drawing and 'boundary work' and the significance of the metaphor of 'maps of knowledge', see T. F. Gieryn's lively Cultural Boundaries of Science. Credibility on the Line (1999). We focus on internal boundaries between disciplines, while Gieryn's main concern is with the inside-outside boundary of science and its interface with society at large. Nevertheless, his discussion, in chapter one, of John Tyndall's rhetorical separation of science and engineering has significant points of contact with the argument developed here. 17. Strictly, things may be more complicated. Consider an ethnographer mapping the distribution of children's games. In village A the game called 'X' is played in one way, in village B the game called 'X' is played with a variation in one of its rules. Neither the adults nor the children may be aware of this, though they know how they play or played 'X'. The distribution of their knowledge creates a boundary though they do not have knowledge of the boundary. Only the ethnographer knows. This complicates, but does not undermine, the discussion to follow. 18. Both the terminology of S-and N-predicates, and the subsequent discussion of selfreferential systems of intentional action are taken from an extremely important paper by Barry, see Barnes (1983) . Barnes has further developed these ideas in his analysis of power (1988). 19. We should also remember that 'mentalities' need not be thought of as innate, individual dispositions. They can be seen as the secondary product of prior forms of disciplinary organization and socialization. We can, and probably should, think of them as effects rather than causes. 20. Tricomi (1923) trans., iii; Vincenti & Wagoner (1951), p. 8. 21 . The substitutions for Tricomi's x, y, z are x = Y, y = -X, and z = Z. 22. One might argue that the pure mathematical form can be interpreted as having a kind of physical meaning in giving the Z coordinate of a point as a function of X and Y in a (three-dimensional) X,Y,Z-space. The pure mathematician would treat this geometrical and spatial meaning as derivative and secondary. It need not be involved in setting up the equation. and, while it may be useful for pedagogic purposes, it is in no way fundamental. 23. The philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe called this creative process by the name of 'linguistic idealism' and sought to identify the range of cases to which it was properly applicable. Roughly, this was identified with the social. See Anscombe (1981) 112-33. The reference by Anscombe to 'idealism' should not be taken to suggest that an appreciation of the role of these processes involves a commitment to any more general form of philosophical idealism, for example to the belief that there are no independent, material objects. 24. A clear example of a parallel kind is provided by the Nobel and engineering prize winner Irving Langmuir, who published different aspects of the same research on incandescent filaments in physics and engineering journals. See W.G. Vincenti (1990) , pp. 227-28. 25. On salience, see Lewis (1969), pp. 35-36, 38, 57, 158-59. 26 . The false opposition of the social rather than the natural (when actually boundaries are typically both) is a version of the wide-spread (but equally false) belief that we must choose between knowledge being social and it being about an independent material reality. That it can be both often seems to elude critics. It was clearly with issues of this kind in mind that one referee identified the 'central question' as, 'what is the relation of the paper to the sociology of scientific knowledge and what is its take on the concept of social construction?' The answer is that scientific concepts are social constructions, social constructions are social institutions and social institutions are to be analyzed by means of Barnes' self-referential model. The issue then becomes one of showing how concepts with a reference to an independent material world can be analyzed in this way. The answer is given in detail in Bloor (1996 Bloor ( , 1997 . The same referee also points out that the philosopher John Searle has used the concept of self-reference in his The Construction of Social Reality (1995) . What is the relation between Searle's and Barnes's ideas? The answer is that Searle's picture is individualistic while Barnes' is sociological. Self-reference arises from interaction rather than being a logical property of thoughts that are assumed to be the achievement of the individual psyche. The difference is explained in the 1996 article cited above. 27. Despite these comments, one referee felt that we 'shy away from saying how the social is involved in making something salient'. Surely, the comment continued, advocates of the sociology of knowledge 'in its strongest form' would take the view that 'facts', and that presumably means all facts, would be 'manufactured as salient by social interaction and negotiation'. We disagree. Clearly, as we have just indicated, salience can be socially constructed, but it is an important characteristic of salience that it is not always so constructed and on occasion does indeed have a pre-social or extra-social basis. To confine one's self wholly to socially constructed forms of salience would be to remove one of the discipline's most important and necessary resources. It is difficult to see how, without it, one can build plausible explanations of basic social processes such as co-ordination and the creation of conventions and institutions. The social is itself in need of explanation; it is not an unexplained explainer. The idea that in some instances material objects or physical processes are indeed automatically salient is not one from which sociologists ought to shy away. Logically it is needed to stop an explanatory regress in exactly the same way that Wittgenstein needed automatic and 'blind' rulefollowing to stop the regress in his sociological account of rules. But just as a blind step in rule-following is not necessarily to be counted as a right step, so a salient distinction need not be counted as a right one. It can come to be over-ridden and deemed misleading in the light of further knowledge or experience. 28. For example, Ludwig Prandtl's (1875 Prandtl's ( -1953 universally-used theory of the boundary layer depended on generating a modified and simplified form of the Navier-Stokes equations which, 50 years after its introduction, still lacked any secure mathematical grounding that would meet the demands of rigor as they were understood in pure mathematics. See K. Nickel (1973) . A somewhat different, but equally suggestive, example is provided by the report that specialists in general relativity divide sharply on the issue of whether they use and trust numerical methods, employing considerable computing capacity, or whether they insist on more traditional, mathematical methods of analysis. The 'analytical relativists', it is said, look down on the 'numerical relativists'. See Kennefick (2000) . The confrontation between those who trust mathematical procedures which depend on the use of computers, and those who ultimately will only place their trust in the capacity of the intellect to survey and grasp a proof in its entirety, comes to a head when human safety is at issue. What about safety-critical programs for which a formal proof is required that they are free of error, but where that proof can only be provided by a computer? A fascinating sociological analysis is given in MacKenzie (2001). 29. In the language of the sociologist Max Weber, we are talking here about the emergence of different 'status groups' with their own characteristic sense of honor and deference and their superiority to outsiders. See Barnes (1995) , chap. 5. 30. On extreme solutions, see T.C. Schelling (1998), p. 94. 31 . A classic discussion of the purity of categories and its social meaning is to be found in the works of Mary Douglas (1966 Douglas ( , 1970 33. Grabiner (1974) dealt with the phenomenon that Kármán identified as the change from construction to codification. She identifies a significant cause of the change in the shifting role of the mathematician from court savant to teacher. 34. See Klein (1979) . Whereas Kármán characterized the formalistic preoccupations in pure mathematics by means of an unflattering medical analogy, Klein described it as a form of degenerate connoisseurship, where the actual use of the treasured artifacts has been forgotten (see p. 65, also pp. 10-11). For other indications of the Kleinian background of Kármán's position, see pages 2, 8, 19, 37, 48, 55 and 195. 35. See Manegold (1969) and Schubring (1989) . For the background of the German debates over pure and applied mathematics and their institutional location, see Ringer (1969) . It is necessary to point out, however, that the identification of styles and traditions of work within the history of mathematics is a matter of continuing discussion, and there is no clear consensus on many issues. For example, Klein is sometimes counted as a contributor to a highly abstract and formal mode of physical theorizing in which he is aligned with David Hilbert; at other times he is set in contrast to Hilbert, as a 'countermodernist' opposed to Hilbert's 'modernism'. For the latter, see Mehrtens (1990) ; for the former see Schweber (1986 it is thought to be (on some level of thought, action and utterance) just is that which constitutes the boundary. While Kline's paper admirably fills out and exemplifies the empirical dimension of Mayr's program, our paper can be taken as a contribution to its theoretical development. 37. For simplicity, the discussion here is in terms of the hodograph before the thin-aerofoil approximation (Figure 2a) . Consistent with the explanation at the end of the second paragraph from the end of the section on Transonic Aerodynamic Theory -First Steps, the approximation process also changes the geometry of the boundary that represents the wedge surface in the hodograph. These make the contingencies less apparent though still valid. 38. The rearward wedge of known angle, where the velocities have a similarly known direction, is also a readily formulated problem at these speeds. For reasons that are too complicated to go into here, the entire problem at transonic speeds below Mach 1 is much more difficult, hence the additional approximations in the work of Cole and Trilling. 39 . A referee has asked us to engage with Peter Galison's idea of the 'trading zone' as outlined in, for example, chapter 9 of his Image and Logic (1997). As we understand it, the idea of a trading zone is that, at the interface of two subgroups, a special-purpose language, a pidgin, will be developed to facilitate communication and interaction. At least, such a pidgin will develop if the structure of interests encourages interaction, that is, some manner of 'trading'. This limited, special-purpose structure may be facilitated by shared interaction with material objects whose use is common to some or all members of the two sub-groups (for example the objects traded or, perhaps, the instruments used by two sub-groups of scientists). The larger theoretical purpose behind Galison's attention to trading zones and their pidgin lies in his opposition to the idea that different scientific sub-groups will either (i) remain locked in the concepts of distinct and incommensurable frameworks of thought and hence have no communication, or (ii) communicate by means of 'translation'. His point is that (i) communication is possible, and (ii) it characteristically takes place by the creation of a common language, not by translation between two pre-existing languages which stay disjoint from one another. What, then, is the link between Galison's ideas and those developed here? Our view is that the ideas discussed here are consistent with what has been said about trading zones though our stress has often, though not always, been on those situations where the subgroups concerned have perceived their interests as being in opposition to one another. For this reason we have approached boundaries by asking what goes into, and encourages, their construction rather than what goes into their being overcome or transcended. We are therefore mostly looking at the opposite side of the coin to Galison. There has been little occasion to lay stress on the process of creating a zone of interaction, where previously there was little or no contact. Nevertheless a proper understanding of what is involved in concept application, where shared standards and conventions are necessary, however local they are, points clearly to a common factor in our two accounts. Self-referential processes are central in sustaining the conventions governing concepts for talking about the material world just as they are for signaling and hence generating boundaries between groups. Thus one can say that both the boundaries discussed in this paper and the pidgin concepts stressed by Galison are special cases of a general process involving the creation of conventions and institutions, and hence of self-reference. A fuller treatment would address the question of how the model of the trading zone, drawn from anthropology, differs from existing analyses of concept application. The emphasis on the creative character of the interaction between sub-groups is to be welcomed and will be readily accepted by those who already advocate theories of language in which all acts of concept application are deemed to be, in an important sense, creative. Such theories have already been elaborated in a variety of forms and terminologies. Some are couched in terms of the 'interaction theory of metaphor', some in terms of 'the displacement of concepts', some in terms of 'language games' and their creation, some in terms of 'finitism'. 40. It is remarkable that a commitment to rigorous logic can go hand-in-hand with a highly unrigorous epistemology and ontology. The logician Gottlob Frege could speak vaguely of the mind grasping concepts without any plausible model of how this process works. For a sociological analysis of this phenomenon see Bloor (1991) Lynch (1992) and Bloor (1992) . 43. Even eminent scientists can be disconcertingly uninformative when they come to address these questions. For example, 'the enormous usefulness of mathematics in the natural sciences is something bordering on the mysterious and there is no rational explanation for it'. It is in fact a 'miracle'. Thus wrote E. P. Wigner (1967) Mathematical operations are based on physical operations. This makes it wholly non-miraculous that mathematics applies to the world. Such applications simply return the structure to its source and, as it were, re-discover the original pattern in the world. Predictive power would then follow from general inductive considerations. That is to say: an initial structural similarity increases the probability of further structural similarity. If there is a 'miracle' here, it is the everyday miracle of induction. 44. This argument is developed in detail by J.L. Mackie (1966) . Though Mackie does not mention the fact, a version of this position is to be found in Klein (1932) , first published in 1908. Klein says,
The tendency to crowd intuition completely off the field and attain to really pure logical investigations seems to me not completely feasible. It seems to me one must retain something, albeit a minimum, of intuition. One must always use a certain intuition in the most abstract formulation with the symbols one uses in operations, in order to recognize the symbols again, even if one thinks only about the shape of the letters'. Klein goes on to argue that, even if the formal rules of arithmetic could be shown to be consistent, this would prove nothing about real arithmetic and integers because the proof would not show that 'the laws . . . are actually valid for numbers with which we are intuitionally familiar'. Only half the problem would have been solved. 'The second, the more epistemological part of the problem, which has to do with the justification for the application of these laws to the actual conditions, is not even touched, although it must of course be solved also if one will really build the foundations of arithmetic'. Klein also remarks that if pure logic alone is taken to belong to pure mathematics, then this second problem, and hence arithmetic itself, must be countered 'as belonging to applied mathematics'. (p. 14)
45. The suggestion has been put to us that Liepmann and Bryson are here using the word 'rigor' loosely or even incorrectly. Are they really talking about rigor or some other property of an argument? It is important, however, not to be drawn into evaluative and legislative questions of this kind. The word means what its users make it mean by their employment of it. For the historian and analyst that usage is data to be recorded and, if possible, explained. Our point is that 'rigor' is a virtue which is understood in subtly different ways by different mathematical practitioners. This phenomenon would be rendered invisible if variation was discounted by deeming it to be a mere manifestation of error.
